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being none of these. 16 Like inhabitants of prisons and asylums, refugees in camps were segregated from the wider community and given little opportunity to exercise choice. They did not enjoy the freedoms afforded to the majority of citizens, as inhabitants did not generally have access to education, employment or the rights to purchase property that are assumed to be afforded to citizens. As with school students, soldiers in barracks, and prison and asylum inhabitants, refugees in camps are subject to monitoring and behavioural constraints that go far beyond that to which other citizens are subject. Such institutions shape behaviour to accord with what authorities deem to be acceptable. As Lippert observed, these lead to judgements of individuals' characters according to their degree of conformity to, or deviation from, the norm so established.
17
Crisp and Jacobsen refer to the enormous variety in "size, socio-economic structure and political character" of refugee camps. 18 The authors refer to crisis situations where refugees, having fled immediate danger, effectively create refugee camps to which international bodies then provided support. Those within these camps found that living with people of shared background provided a sense of safety and security. In such camps, there were no restrictions on movement between the camps and local villages and towns. In contrast, many refugee camps established by governments are done so with the intent of preventing camp inhabitants from mixing with local people; and to facilitate repatriation.
As well as changes from camp to camp, there were changes across time. Post world war two, camp inhabitants were given tasks to keep them busy and evaluated for selection for settlement elsewhere according to how well they conformed to camp discipline. In the 1980s, there were growing concerns of the damage done by long term institutionalisation which might prevent a camp inhabitant being able to live independently. 19 The response to this, more evident in the 1990s, was a move to 'empower' refugees with camp inhabitants encouraged to take a larger role in managing the camp and to take more responsibility for their own lives.
Non-government organisations that until then were largely involved in dispensing aid, began to engage in "community development" activities in the camps.
20
Australian immigration detention centres and their offshore equivalents share some of the characteristics of refugee camps established by governments. The majority of those held in the Nauru offshore processing centre were eventually found to be refugees. In Nauru, as with refugee camp inhabitants, the asylum seekers did not enjoy the same rights of Nauruan citizens. They did not have access to employment or education, or the freedom to live where they liked on the island. However, as will be explored later, unlike the approach taken in refugee camps in the 1990s that Lippert highlights, there was little evidence that the Australian Coalition government was concerned with the welfare of the Nauru offshore processing centre's inhabitants. To the contrary, the authors argue that the harsh conditions of the Nauru centre were a tactic of government to encourage asylum seekers to give up their refugee claims and return to their home country. In other words, the conditions in the Nauru processing centre were designed to persuade asylum seekers to adopt compliant behaviour.
In giving effect to a policy objective, governments rely on their apparatuses of security (for example, military, police, government agencies, non-government organisations and private companies) drawn from the general population. It is therefore in a government's interests to make policy palatable to the broader community To bring this about, they may choose to frame a policy debate in a particular way to heavily influence public discourse, and hence public opinion, on a particular topic. Other tactics used by government to bolster public support of its policies include controlling access to information that might cause a negative response from the public. 21 This can be facilitated by a government enlisting the aid of other organisations to achieve its ends through contracting out its functions and then maintaining control through the conditions of that contract. All of these can be seen in relation to the establishment and defence of the Pacific Solution.
To explore the experiences of asylum seekers held in the offshore processing centre on Nauru according to a governmentality approach, we now consider the physical conditions of the centre and the processing of refugee claims from the perspectives of some of the Afghan asylum seekers. We explore these aspects as examples of how the Coalition government sought to persuade asylum seekers to adopt compliant behaviour, and how other bodies were utilised by the Coalition government to actualise its policy. We then examine the way in which the government garnered the support of the Australian population. We conclude by reflecting on the findings of this paper in the context of what is known to date about Australia's current offshore processing on Nauru.
The experiences of asylum seekers on Nauru under Coalition policy

Physical conditions
The physical conditions of the processing centre on Nauru under Coalition government policy were harsh. When the first asylum seekers arrived on Nauru in September 2001, they were housed in a campsite containing large tents that each accommodated up to thirty people. After some months, metal containers that held fifteen people were erected to replace the tents, and a second campsite was later established as more asylum seekers were sent to Nauru. Both sites were enclosed with high wire fences. 22 These developments did little to compensate for the oppressive weather conditions on Nauru and little relief from the humidity was provided. campsites that meant that there were no means to cool or light the sleeping areas. 23 Being a tropical island with hot and humid weather, Nauru also had a high mosquito population.
It was terrible. The roofs were made of metal and some days the temperature was over 50 degrees under the metal. The walls were plastic. The houses were too long and too hot. These were not conditions for humans.
24
Given Nauru's remoteness, fresh food was in short supply in the detention camps and there were reports that the food was often stale and sometimes insects were found in it. There was also little drinkable water in the detention camps, and the situation worsened as the number of those detained on Nauru increased. Often there would be no water for washing clothes, flushing the toilet or for taking a shower, creating unsanitary conditions.
The unavoidable consequence of water shortage is lack of sanitation and cleanliness.
Our toilets and bathrooms are particularly very dirty and harbour several types of flies and mosquitoes…medical team called us for a meeting and said the increase of diarrhoea is alarming. There are two bloody diarrhoea cases hospitalised at present.
The doctors say that our surroundings is not clean and hygienic, and its main cause is shortage of water.
25
The unsanitary conditions led to further incidences of diarrhoea and other medical problems, such as gastro-intestinal diseases, skin and eye infections, and dengue fever. 26 The lack of adequate medical care on Nauru meant that asylum seekers with conditions requiring specialist attention had to wait lengthy periods for it, with some finally being flown to Australian hospitals to receive it. 27 The consequences for these asylum seekers meant months of pain and suffering that could have been averted or at least minimised should they have been near appropriate medical facilities. Opportunities for communication with anyone outside of the processing campsites were also severely limited, particularly in the first few months. When asylum seekers first arrived on Nauru, they were unable to make phone calls to their families or anyone else.
There was no access to radio, television or newspapers in the first months of the camp and thus no access to information on what was happening in their own countries. After some months, phones became available but only a few people each day were able to make calls.
28
This meant that asylum seekers "could not contact our families to find out what was happening at home". 29 Some of those who were later returned to their home countries discovered upon their arrival that their families had moved. Services], they could be gaoled".
32
The harshness of the physical conditions of the processing centre on Nauru was a reflection of the Coalition government's intention to persuade asylum seekers to abandon their claims for refugee status and voluntarily return to their own countries, and the hosting and management of the camps is an example of the Coalition government's recruitment of other bodies to actualise its policy. The Nauru government was persuaded with the offer of a considerable increase in Australian aid to host a site of detention on behalf of Australia. remained willing to manage most of the operations of the camps until they were closed in 2008. Similarly, the Nauru government remained willing to host the camps on their territory.
Using Foucault's terminology, these bodies, particularly the Nauru government and the IOM,
were Australian government apparatuses of security that enabled the offshore processing policy to be executed on Nauru.
A consequence of involving other bodies and individuals in Australia's offshore processing policy, some of whom might not be predisposed to be supportive of government policy, was an increased risk of information about conditions in the Nauru camps being communicated to the Australian public, and hence, increased opposition to the policy. To minimise this risk, the Coalition government required contractors to sign confidentiality agreements.
36
The contracting of others as apparatuses of security also meant that a barrier was placed in the way of any Australians independent of their government being able to access the Taliban there would be trouble if we were sent back, so we couldn't tell the truth', says one man.
54
The majority of Afghans on Nauru found themselves in limbo after their claims were rejected and towards the end of 2003, some of them participated in a hunger strike and sewed their lips together. 55 The hunger strike ended after a month when the Minister for Immigration The consequences of the Coalition government's success in persuading hundreds of asylum seekers to return to their own countries were dire for at least some of those who were returned. It is very likely that such outcomes were evident for more of those returned.
As outlined in the previous section, the Coalition government had contracted out its apparatuses of security in establishing and operating the offshore processing centre on Nauru, and was able to influence the actions of its contracted bodies. This was similarly evident to some extent with the claims processing, in the ability of the Coalition government to get the involvement of the UNHCR, at least initially, to help process the refugee claims of some of the asylum seekers who arrived in the beginning. However, this case also highlights the limits of the Coalition government's ability to recruit this particular body as one of its apparatuses of security. The UNHCR's mandate is to provide for the protection of refugees, and to only assess the protection claims of asylum seekers who arrive in countries where governments do not have the resources to do so themselves. The Coalition government's request that the UNHCR undertake the processing of protection claims on Nauru placed the international agency in a compromised position. As the UNHCR relies on funding from member nations, especially those of the wealthier nations, it strives to maintain good relations with countries like Australia. Accordingly, the UNHCR agreed to process the refugee claims of the asylum seekers who had arrived on two of the early boats but it refused to process any further arrivals. It also made public its concerns about being asked to process asylum seekers on Nauru. from the mainland fed into the perception that such people should be kept apart from the general community because of some deviant characteristic. The government's actions were perceived as being strong and decisive and the voices of those who called for a more compassionate and/or rights-based response struggled to be heard.
Alternatives to the framing of asylum seekers as engaging in deviant behaviour were limited due to the requirement that government and contractor employees on Nauru had to sign confidentiality agreements. In addition, the Coalition government was able to control the access to the processing camps on the island by anyone independent of the government through securing the support of the Nauru government to actualise this. Thus the conditions for the asylum seekers were rarely witnessed by independent sources and communicated to the outside world for some time. As noted earlier, aside from two journalists and an advocate who managed to access the camps in 2002 by posing as tourists, other journalists, advocates and lawyers were prevented from visiting the Nauru facility until 2004-2005. However, even then, the remote location of Nauru in relation to Australia meant that to travel there was very time consuming and expensive. The remoteness of Nauru was and remains an effective barrier to independent oversight of offshore processing.
Detention on Nauru 2013
There are similarities in the policies of the previous Coalition and current Labor governments in their focus on and efforts to persuade asylum seekers on Nauru to be compliant, and to hire other bodies to enable their policies. The Coalition government's offshore processing policy that held asylum seekers on Nauru last decade was enabled by the bodies who were recruited as apparatuses of security to actualise government policy. The physical conditions under which asylum seekers were held on Nauru, the initial refugee claims processing that denied natural justice to asylum seekers, and the constant pressures placed on those whose claims were initially rejected, were attempts to persuade asylum seekers into compliant behaviourthat is, to voluntarily return to their own countries. In order to maximise support for its policy within the Australian electorate, the Coalition government required its contracted bodies and their employees to sign confidentiality agreements and, in the case of the Nauru government, to act to prevent Australians independent of the state visiting Nauru in the first three years. 79 Pickering, Refugees and State Crime.
Despite the despairing impact on the asylum seekers who were held on Nauru under the Coalition government's Pacific Solution, and the fact that the majority were found to be refugees or owed protection on other humanitarian grounds, Australia is once again responsible for the indefinite detention of asylum seekers on both Nauru and Manus Island under the Labor government's current policies. Reports from independent visitors to the detention camp on Nauru highlight that physical conditions and concerns about delays in claims processing mirror those in the camps a decade ago, and similar mental health concerns are also evident. 80 With many of the recently erected buildings destroyed in the July 2013 fires in the camp, physical conditions are now likely to be harsher for asylum seekers on Nauru.
As with the Coalition government before it, the Labor government has contracted other bodies to enable its policy on Nauru. The Nauru government is again hosting the addition, up until the recent fires, asylum seekers detained on Nauru had some access to means of communication with the outside world, such as limited access to the internet and telephones. 83 The Labor government has also allowed a number of human rights organisations to visit the detention camp on Nauru and release public reports that raise their concerns, although Australia's Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) did not allow photographs to be taken. 84 While the Nauru government has allowed journalists to visit the island, up until June 2013 DIAC has denied them access to the detention camp. 85 However, the public reports of these independent witnesses as at the time of writing have yet to shift the views of enough Australians or Members of Parliament to alter Labor's offshore processing policy. The Labor government, and the Opposition, have consistently portrayed messages over the past few years that numbers of asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat are cause for alarm, those engaged in people smuggling are "evil", and that asylum seekers must be deterred from embarking on boat journeys to Australia to avoid any further deaths at sea en route. Despite the leaks evident in the Labor government's attempts to control information from the Nauru camps, the greater access to communications technology by those detained on Nauru, and the public reports of others who have visited Nauru, the majority of public opinion in Australia on this issue is yet to shift. This suggests that the efforts of the Coalition government in the last decade in framing asylum seekers arriving by boat as deviant, its ability to actualise its Pacific Solution through its apparatuses of security, and its claims that its policies were responsible for the fall in numbers of boat arrivals by the middle of the last decade, continue to have an impact on public opinion in Australia.
The accounts of asylum seekers held on Nauru last decade highlight the despair that resulted from the governing strategies of the Coalition government. Reports from asylum seekers, some of those employed in the processing camp on Nauru, and independent visitors over the past nine months are now consistently portraying that despair is once again the result of Australia's offshore processing policy. Policy alternatives that do not seek to force asylum seekers into compliant behaviour that generates such despair are much needed.
